Legislative Developments
New market investigation tool
Legislative amendments granting the Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA) powers to conduct market investigations entered into force on 1 July. The new framework allows the NCA to investigate markets and impose remedies where competition is found to be significantly restricted, even in the absence of an infringement of the Competition Act.
The market investigation tool is intended to complement existing enforcement mechanisms, including prohibitions on anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance and merger control, and is designed as a sector-neutral instrument applicable across all markets. Based on the Norwegian Competition Authority's published priorities, it is likely to relevant for instance in relation to the grocery sector, financial services, and digital markets. Remedies may be both behavioral and structural, subject to procedural safeguards under Norwegian administrative law.
The introduction of the new powers followed considerable debate during the legislative process, particularly concerning legal certainty and predictability for market participants. While several proposed elements were adjusted prior to adoption to strengthen procedural safeguards, the practical application of the market investigation tool and its impact on enforcement remain to be seen.
Competition Law Committee proposes comprehensive modernisation of the Competition Act
In a report submitted to the Ministry of Trade and Fisheries in December, a government-appointed expert committee proposed a comprehensive modernisation of the Competition Act, concluding that the current substantive rules largely function well and should be retained. The proposals primarily focus on procedural reforms aimed at improving enforcement efficiency, shortening case processing times and strengthening companies’ legal safeguards. Unfortunately, the Committee limits itself to rather minor adjustments and it has not seized the opportunity to propose amendments that could have had a more meaningful impact.
In particular, we consider it unfortunate that the Committee proposes to maintain the existing appeals system in competition cases, only with certain targeted adjustments. From our perspective this approach makes good sense in merger control cases. In contrast, for infringement cases we think that the power to make decisions should be moved from the Competition Authority to the Competition Appeals Tribunal as first instance, as suggested by a minority within the Committee. Such a model would transform the Competition Authority to a dedicated investigative body and reduced the implications of the impartiality risk that is inherent in the current system.
Another unhelpful proposal from the Committee is that judicial review in competition cases shall commence in the District Court, rather than in the Court of Appeal, which is the situation today. Introducing the District Court as first instance will add an extra procedural stage and increased time consumption and costs without any obvious benefit in terms of legal certainty. Also on this point we side with the minority within the Committee that recommends maintaining the Court of Appeal as the first level of judicial review.
The report has been circulated for public consultation, with further legislative follow-up expected during 2026.
